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 Agricultural expenditure in the future European Union budget 
 
1. Introduction 
The link between the European Union (EU) budget and further reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) is central and the issue of net financial balances due to the 
CAP, although its instruments have undergone significant reforms since 1993, remains a 
bone of contention in European politics. 
The economic literature
1 has long questioned the adequacy of EU policies to address the 
challenges facing Europe and judged the current allocation of financial resources as being 
at odds with the future of Europe. Considerable evaluation and discussion is going on in 
academic  debate  (VV.AA.,  2009;  Ecorys,  2008),  within  the  Commission  (European 
Commission, 2007, 2008, 2010a and 2010b), in Member States
2, and in many think tanks 
(ECNS et al., 2009; Cooper et al., 2009). These efforts address the general issue of the 
economic and political foundations of the EU budget and reconsider the question of the 
appropriate  government  level  in  the  EU  for  various  public  policies.  A  number  of 
proposals for a new budget framework have been formulated to alleviate the confusion of 
allocational and distributional problems affecting current decision making. The CAP has 
few advocates, even as it stands today after several reforms. Nonetheless, the tremendous 
resilience of the CAP to reform is impressive. 
In  order  to  shed  some  light  on  this  resilience,  we  analyse  the  budget  issues  from  a 
positive point of view by assuming net financial balances are a major force governing the 
politics of the EU (Mrak and Rant, 2010). With its lion’s share of the budget, the CAP 
cannot avoid scrutiny and is bound to change. In principle, there are two opposite ways 
this could happen. New allocations across budget items could be decided in the next 
Financial perspectives (FP)): this would change the CAP outlays maintaining the present 
agricultural policies. In this case, distributional effects across countries would take place 
changing the size, but not the sign of the net balances due to the CAP. Alternatively, 
there could be a deep reform of the first and second pillar policies maintaining total 
agricultural  expenditure.  If  this  were  the  case,  distributional  effects  across  countries 
would be the consequences of changes in the net balances due to CAP reform. 
The main objective of the paper is to assess the likelihood of the intuitive and widely held 
expectation that something is going to happen to CAP expenditure as a consequence of 
the debate on the next FP. We are going to do this under the assumption that national 
interests are the driving forces behind EU budget and CAP reform negotiations. First, we 
quantify national interests in FP negotiations by computing the net balances resulting 
from the 2007-2013 negotiations. We then assess the implications of a reduction in the 
CAP  budget  allocation  by  introducing  the  concepts  of  isobudget  and  isobalance 
functions. 
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Sapir et al. (2003). 
2 See  Clasper and Thurston (2010) for an overall review.   3
2. The EU budget debate 
The EU budget experienced a sudden acceleration with the start of the CAP in the Sixties 
and then the establishment of structural funds in the Seventies. The budget also grew as a 
consequence of the progressive enlargements of the EU, especially after the accession of 
the Eastern European countries. Today, the EU-27 features a budget of more than EUR 
114 billion) aimed at a political project that has significantly widened its original policy 
set. 
Based on the current rules (Art. 311 of the Lisbon Treaty), the Union provides itself with 
the necessary means to achieve its goals and enforce its policies. The budget  is funded 
by “own resources”, one of the most distinctive elements of the process of European 
integration.  Own  resources  include  three  components:  the  so-called  traditional  own 
resources (TOR), originating from the custom duties and tariffs applied at the common 
borders, a common national contribution corresponding to a share (0.3%) of the value 
added tax and a “residual” contribution expressed in terms of the gross national product 
(GNP)  that  over  the  years  has  become  the  most  relevant  funding  source  (European 
Commission, 2008). In the current budget plan (2007-13), the own resources ceiling as a 
percentage  of  GNP  was  set  at  1.24%.  The  growing  absolute  dimension  of  national 
contributions to the EU budget based on the GNP led the wealthiest Member states to 
formulate the principle of “juste retour” and the Fontainebleu Agreement (1984) states 
the  right  of  any  member  State  bearing  an  excessive  financial  burden  weighted  to  its 
relative prosperity to call for a correction
3. 
Traditionally, the imbalances of national positions vis à vis the EU budget have been 
measured through the net budgetary balance (NBB), that is, the difference between the 
contribution  of  each  Member  State  to  the  EU  budget  and  the  expenses  that  the  EU 
supplies  in  their  favour.  The  NBB  is  a  very  simple  indicator  that  synthesizes  the 
differences between the financial costs and benefits accrued to each Member State as a 
consequence of EU membership. Partial NBB  can also be calculated,  with respect to 
single items or even single policies. Accordingly, partial NBBs highlight the items in 
which each Member State is a net contributor or beneficiary. On the other hand, the use 
of the NBB concept has often been criticized since it is by construction unable to catch all 
the immaterial and non-financial benefits and costs deriving from joining the EU (Nuňez 
Ferrer, 2007; Gros, 2008; de la Fuente, Doménech and Rant, 2008; Pietras, 2008). 
The budget review process officially began in September 2007 at a time when expiry of 
the current financial framework was still quite a long way off (European Commission, 
2007).  This  should  have  helped  to  keep  the  debate  independent  of  current  political 
negotiation (Panichi, 2009). Indeed, after the start of public discussion with all the actors 
leading to a summary paper by the EU Commission, the contents of which are rather 
generic and vague (Grybauskaitè, 2008), the debate became rather stagnant and unable to 
focus on meaningful elements. 
                                                 
3 The  most relevant application of the principle of  “juste retour” is represented by the British rebate. 
However,  the  establishment  of  a  general  principle  has  paved  the  way  to  many  other  temporary  or 
permanent corrections    4
More recently, the Commission tried to bring the topic back to the centre of the stage 
with  two  more  documents:  Europe  2020  (European  Commission  2010a)  and  a 
Communication  to  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  (European  Commission 
2010b)  in  which  the  Commission  illustrates  the  main  goals  of  the  EU  after  2013. 
Although the positions expressed by the EU Commission aim to obtain a large consensus, 
Member States hold quite different views on FP negotiations. An analysis of the national 
positions is carried out by Clasper and Thurston (2010) who divide Member States into 
five groups according to their position on the budget. Quite interestingly, the positions 
assumed by Member States do not necessarily match what would have been expected as 
far as the sign of their net balance is concerned.  
 
3. Isobudget and isobalance 
3.1 Total and partial net balances  
There are two main issues in the debate on the EU budget: the absolute size of the budget 
and the allocation of expenditure across policies. These two issues are tightly related in a 
complex  political  game  in  which  any  attempt  to  review  the  budget  has  usually  been 
blocked by crossed vetoes. 
It is quite likely that NBBs are going to play a crucial role in the debate on budget review 
and the FP after 2013 as has been the case in previous FP negotiations. Even if NBBs 
undoubtedly represent an oversimplification of the Member States’ objective function, 
they  are  the  most  immediately  visible  result  of  negotiations  and  provide  useful  and 
readily  available  proxies  for  national  interests.  We  compute  total  and  partial  net 
budgetary balances (NBB) for each member state in the 2007-2008 period. 
The total NBB of a Member State i can be expressed as: 
i i i C E NBB − =                                                                                                                 (4.1)  
where:   
Ei is total allocated expenditure to member state i from the EU budget, expressed in 
payments, 
Ci are total contributions of member state i to the EU budget.  
Partial NBBs are calculated by decomposing the total NBB of each Member State into 
expected net cash flows from individual budget items. We define the partial NBB of a 























                                                                                      
  (4.2)  
where: 
Ei,j is total expenditure allocated to member state i under item j,   
EEU,j  is total expenditure under issue j at EU level,  
CEU are total contributions of all member states.   
Our approach for computing each element in (4.1) and (4.2) is described at length in De 
Filippis and Sardone (2010). Partial NBBs of each individual Member State sum up to 
the Member State’s total NBB whereas the sum of partial NBBs for a particular issue 
across Member States equals zero.   5
Mrak  and  Rant  (2010)  point  out  that  partial  NBBs  of  EU  Member  States  have  two 
interesting  properties  that  make  them  attractive  as  a  measure  of  individual  Member 
State’s national interest in the underlying FPN item:  
1.  First,  for  each  Member  State,  a  partial  NBB  measures  net  contribution  of  the 
underlying  item  to  the  total  NBB  of  that  Member  State,  expressed  in  million 
euros. Positive partial NBBs improve whereas negative partial NBBs deteriorate a 
Member States’ total NBB.   
2.  Second, for individual issues, partial NBBs measure net redistribution of funds 
across Member States, expressed in million euros. Member States with positive 
partial  NBBs  are  net  recipients  whereas  Member  States  with  negative  partial 
NBBs are net contributors under a specific item.   
3.2 Isobalance and isobudget 
For each EU member, the isobalance curve identifies all combinations of two budget 
items that keep its NBB constant. We are going to consider budget allocation between 
Natural Resources (NR) and Other expenditure (O). Consequently, starting from (4.2), 
the isobalance country  i can be written as: 

































































                              (4.3). 
The  isobalance  can  be  usefully  compared  with  a  more  traditional  isoexpenditure 
constraint at EU level, i.e., the isobudget curve defined as follows:  
O EU EU NR EU E E E , , − =                                                                                                   (4.4). 
In  (4.4),  the  angular  coefficient  is  obviously  1  as  in  any  budget  constraint.  The  β 
coefficient in (4.3) is more interesting since it summarizes the distributive impact of the 
CAP vis à vis all other budget expenditure (Table 1). 
The  sign  of  this  coefficient  determines  whether  natural  resources  and  other  budget 
sections  are  complements  or  substitutes.  A  negative  coefficient  implies  a  positively 
sloped  isobalance  curve  suggesting  that  the  two  partial  NBBs  are  complements:  they 
must move in the same direction in order to keep the balance unchanged. It also means 
that the two NBBs have opposite signs. As a matter of fact, several countries in this 
typology (Austria, Denmark, Finland, France and  Ireland) record positive agricultural 
NBBs  whereas  the  opposite  is  true  for  Cyprus,  Luxembourg,  Malta,  Romania  and 
Slovenia  (Table  2).  For  these  Member  States,  any  reduction  (increase)  in  natural 
resources expenditure should be matched by a more or less than proportional reduction 
(increase) in other budget expenditure.  
A positive β coefficient implies a negatively sloped isobalance curve suggesting that the 
two partial NBBs are substitutes: they must move in opposite directions in order to keep 
the balance unchanged. It also means that the two NBBs share the same sign: negative for 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Cyprus,   6
Malta, Slovenia and Romania and positive for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Consequently, for 
these  countries,  any  reduction  (increase)  in  natural  resources  expenditure  should  be 
matched  by  a  more  or  less  than  proportional  increase  (reduction)  in  other  budget 
expenditure. 
The value of the intercept with the y-axis (α) is negative for net overall contributors to 
the budget with a positive agricultural NBB (Austria, Denmark, France, Finland) and for 
net  overall  beneficiaries  from  the  budget  with  a  negative  agricultural  NBB  (Malta, 
Romania and Slovenia). Conversely, it is positive for net overall beneficiaries from the 
budget  with  a  positive  agricultural  partial  NBB  (Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain) and for 
net overall contributors to the budget with a negative agricultural NBB (Belgium, Cyprus, 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom). 
According to the sign  and value of the α  and β parameters, we can distinguish four 
typologies of countries presented in Table 3. 
The  negative  intercept  (α<0)  case  includes  Member  States  either  with  a  positive 
agricultural net position that reduces the overall contribution to the EU budget or with a 
negative agricultural net position that reduces the overall transfer from the EU budget. A 
negative intercept implies that the two partial budget positions must have opposite signs 
ruling  out  the  possibility  of  negatively  sloped  isobalance  lines.  Consequently,  any 
changes in the agricultural expenditure for these countries should be matched by changes 
in the same direction of the sum of the remaining budget section: these changes will be 
smaller or larger depending on the value of the β coefficient.  
A positively sloped isobalance divides the expenditure space into two regions: countries 
with a positive agricultural net budget improve the overall budget position in the region 
above the isobalance curve whereas the opposite is true for countries with a negative 
agricultural net budget position. Moreover, any positively sloped isobalance cannot have 
an  intercept  which  is  larger  than  actual  expenditure  on  natural  resources  (i.e.,  the 
intercept on the y-axis of the isobudget curve). This is obviously true for the isobalances 
with a negative intercept whereas for α > 0 we get: 
EU O EU NR EU E E E < + = , , β α                                                                                            (4.5) 
since we know that β < 0. 
Downward sloping isobalances result from positive β coefficients. This implies a positive 
intercept (α > 0) with a value which is larger than the overall EU expenditure if β > 1. In 
these cases, any changes in agricultural expenditure should be matched by changes in the 
opposite direction of the sum of the remaining budget sections: these changes may be 
smaller or larger depending on the absolute value of the β coefficients. Any negatively 
sloped  isobalance  divides  the  expenditure  space  into  two  regions:  countries  with  a 
positive  overall  budget  improve  the  balance  in  the  region  above  the  isobalance  and 
worsen it below whereas the opposite is true for overall net contributors. 
We use these results to sketch bargains which may take place in the next FP negotiations. 
Bargaining space is defined as the possible combinations of NR and Other expenditure   7
that will not worsen the overall NBBs of the countries considered. In this analysis, we 
also refer to ‘sensitive countries’ which are those with the highest or lowest opportunity 
cost (benefit) in terms of budget re-allocation since they are the ones that will define the 
largest or smallest possible size of bargaining space. 
In order to keep national balances constant when NR expenditure and the sum of the 
other policies expenditures are budget complements, we have already pointed out that the 
cleavage between countries is based on agricultural rather than total NBBs. The most 
sensitive countries to budget changes are Romania among net agricultural contributors 
and Austria among net agricultural beneficiaries  while the opposite is true for Cyprus 
and Ireland, respectively (Figure 1). It is worth noting in passing that the range variation 
in the isobalance parameters for the net agricultural contributors (solid isobalances) is 
larger than the range for the net agricultural beneficiaries (dotted isobalances).  
If we look for an agreement which allows for an increase in the present budget constraint 
(i.e.,  above  the  isobudget  line),  bargaining  space  (marked  as  B  in  Figure  1)  is  only 
possible if the budget opportunity cost for agricultural net contributors of an agricultural 
expenditure  increase  is  higher  than  the  corresponding  budget  marginal  benefit  for 
agricultural net beneficiaries. Such a condition holds for a country such as Romania that 
may  strike  an  agreement  with  the  other  group  to  increase  both  agricultural  and  non-
agricultural expenditure.  
The  opposite  is  true  for  an  EU  budget  reduction.  In  this  scenario,  the  existence  of 
bargaining  space  requires  the  budget  marginal  benefit  for  net  contributors  of  an 
agricultural expenditure reduction to be lower than the corresponding budget opportunity 
cost for net beneficiaries. This implies that the country in the best position among the net 
agricultural contributors to reach an agreement with net beneficiaries would be Cyprus. 
In order to keep national balances constant when when NR expenditure and the sum of 
the other policies expenditures are budget substitutes, the obvious cleavage is between 
overall net contributors (solid isobalance) and beneficiaries (dotted isobalance). The most 
sensitive countries are Sweden among net contributors and Czech Republic among net 
beneficiaries while the least sensitive are Belgium and Spain respectively (Figure 2).  
In this case, a bargaining region (marked as B in Figure 2) does not seem to exist for 
larger agricultural expenditure since the highest budget opportunity cost (corresponding 
to the lowest negative slope) is registered for net beneficiaries (Czech Republic). Only 
the  least  sensitive  countries,  such  as  Belgium  and  Spain,  would  be  able  to  strike  an 
agreement leading to a reduction in the NR chapter which is more than compensated by 
increases in other chapters. In the same vein, an overall budget reduction could only be 
agreed upon if it implied an increase in non-agricultural expenditure compensated by a 
larger  reduction  in  the  NR  chapter.  It  should  however  be  noted    that  only  the  most 
sensitive countries such as Sweden and Czech Republic would be in a position to accept 
such an outcome. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper focuses on the link between CAP and the EU budget under the intuitive and 
widely held hypothesis that national interests dominate final decisions. The proxy for   8
national  interests  are  net  cash  flows  that  EU  member  states  expect  to  receive  from 
individual  issues  under  the  next  FP  negotiations,  referred  to  as  partial  net  budgetary 
balances. 
We  use  the  isobudget  and  isobalance  curves  to  carry  out  a  comparison  of  national 
interests based on estimated partial net budgetary balances. More specifically, we discuss 
the implications of the ‘net balances problem’ for a possible reduction in the natural 
resources chapter allocation in the next financial perspectives. Although our results are 
still preliminary, we think that the isobalance concept may be quite useful in shedding 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 – Isobalance parameters for the EU Member States 
  α α α α        β β β β       
Belgium  58659.12  0.124 
Denmark  -229781.39  -6.166 
Germany  111710.23  1.281 
Greece  143284.62  1.970 
Spain  81081.77  0.613 
France  -134791.70  -4.095 
Ireland  35025.61  -0.391 
Italy  98707.73  0.997 
Luxemburg  44649.12  -0.182 
Netherlands  99505.12  1.015 
Austria  -573242.48  -13.657 
Portugal  231054.98  3.884 
Finland  -195819.01  -5.426 
Sweden  144356.49  1.993 
United Kingdom  107156.92  1.182 
Czech Republic  611367.82  12.178 
Estonia  331517.38  6.075 
Cyprus  45028.45  -0.173 
Latvia  266378.01  4.654 
Lithuania  188846.51  2.963 
Hungary  193617.50  3.067 
Malta  -101785.79  -3.375 
Poland  188290.57  2.951 
Slovenia  -1278538.20  -29.038 
Slovakia  313930.72  5.691 
Bulgaria  370615.10  6.927 
Romania  -30820454.17  -673.292 
   11
Table 2 – Partial and total net balances for the EU Member States 
  Natural resources  Other expenditure  Total 
Germany  -3844.05  -4262.17  -8106.22 
United Kingdom  -1685.68  -1724.15  -3409.83 
France  1244.41  -4410.80  -3166.38 
Italy  -1523.39  -1315.18  -2838.57 
Netherlands  -1467.84  -1289.31  -2757.15 
Sweden  -453.33  -782.01  -1235.34 
Belgium  -687.08  -73.74  -760.82 
Denmark  126.83  -676.95  -550.12 
Austria  42.08  -497.40  -455.32 
Finland  61.29  -287.85  -226.56 
Luxemburg  -91.38  14.36  -77.02 
Cyprus  -14.00  2.10  -11.90 
Malta  -15.51  45.30  29.79 
Slovenia  -4.39  110.31  105.92 
Estonia  36.59  192.42  229.01 
Latvia  89.71  361.38  451.08 
Bulgaria  72.43  434.31  506.74 
Ireland  963.73  -326.53  637.20 
Slovakia  114.37  563.38  677.75 
Lithuania  230.67  591.64  822.31 
Czech Republic  81.05  854.36  935.42 
Romania  -1.89  1102.66  1100.77 
Hungary  375.23  996.21  1371.44 
Portugal  597.86  2009.79  2607.65 
Spain  2209.44  1172.31  3381.75 
Poland  1360.24  3474.59  4834.83 
Greece  2182.62  3720.94  5903.56 
   12
Table 3 – Member State Typologies (overall net beneficiaries from the budget in bold type) 
α \ β  POSITIVE  NEGATIVE 
POSITIVE  Belgium,  Germany,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands, 
Sweden,  United  Kingdom, 
Cyprus,  Malta,  Slovenia, 
Romania 
Greece,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Czech  Republic,  Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria 
Ireland, 
Cyprus, Luxemburg 
NEGATIVE  -  Austria,  Denmark,  Finland,  
France  
Malta, Romania, Slovenia 
   13













Figure 2 – CAP expenditure as budget substitute 
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